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 Executive Summary 
 
This paper discusses the economics of the Internet backbone. The author discusses 
competition on the Internet backbone as well as relevant competition policy issues. In particular, 
he shows how public protocols, ease of entry, very fast network expansion, connections by the 
same Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) to multiple backbones (ISP multi-homing), and 
connections by the same large web site to multiple ISPs (customer multi-homing) enhance price 
competition and make it very unlikely that any firm providing Internet backbone connectivity 
would find it profitable to degrade or sever interconnection with other backbones in an attempt to 
monopolize the Internet backbone. 
   1
The Economics of the Internet Backbone 
Nicholas Economides 
 
1. Competition Among Internet Backbone Service Providers 
 
Internet Backbone Services 
The Internet is a global network of interconnected networks that connect computers.  The 
Internet allows data transfers as well as the provision of a variety of interactive real-time and 
time-delayed telecommunications services.  Internet communication is based on common and 
public protocols.  Hundreds of millions of computers are presently connected to the Internet.  
Figure 1 shows the expansion of the number of computers connected to the Internet. 
The vast majority of computers owned by individuals or businesses connect to the 
Internet through commercial Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).
1  Users connect to the Internet 
either by dialing their ISP, connecting through cable modems, residential DSL, or through 
corporate networks.  Typically, routers and switches owned by the ISP send the caller’s packets 
to a local Point of Presence “POP” of the Internet.
2 2  Dial-up, cable modem, and DSL access 
POPs as well as corporate networks dedicated access circuits connect to high speed hubs.  High 
speed circuits, leased from or owned by telephone companies, connect the high speed hubs 
forming an “Internet Backbone Network.”  See Figure 2. 
Backbone networks provide transport and routing services for information packets among 
high speed hubs on the Internet.  Backbone networks vary in terms of their geographic coverage.  
Boardwatch magazine has listed the following national backbones.
3   
Market shares of national backbones are listed in Table 2. 
 
Interconnection 
There is wide variance of ISPs in terms of their subscriber size and the network they own.  
However, irrespective of its size, an ISP needs to interconnect with other ISPs so that its 
                                                 
1 Educational institutions and government departments are also connected to the Internet but do not offer 
commercial ISP services. 
2 Small ISPs may not own routers and switches, but rather just aggregate traffic at modem banks and buy direct 
access to a larger ISP. 
3  See http://www.boardwatch.com/isp/summer99/backbones.html.  Boardwatch magazine also lists 348 regional 
backbone networks.   2
customers will reach all computers/nodes on the Internet.  That is, interconnection is necessary to 
provide universal connectivity on the Internet which is demanded by users.  Interconnection 
services at Network Access Points (“NAPs”) and MAEs
4  are complementary to Internet 
transport.  In a sense, the Internet backbone networks are like freeways and the NAPs are like the 
freeway interchanges. 
Internet networks interconnect in two ways:  
 
1)  Private bilateral interconnection; and 
2)  Interconnection at public NAPs. 
 
Private interconnection points and public NAPs are facilities that provide collocation 
space and a switching platform so that networks are able to interconnect.  NAPs’ services are not 
substitutes for ISP or for transport services.  Rather they are a complement to ISP services and to 
transport services.  NAPs allow networks to interconnect more easily by providing the necessary 
space and platform.   
Interconnection at NAPs is governed by bilateral contracts of the parties.  Some NAPs, 
such as the London Internet Exchange (LINX) facilitate such negotiations by posting a set of 
common rules and standard contracts which may be used by its members in their bilateral 
negotiations.  Interconnection of two networks X and Y at a NAP is governed by a contract 
between networks X and Y.  Other NAPs such as the ones owned by MCI do not dictate the 
terms of contracts between third party networks.
5 
In the last few years, there has been a significant increase in the number of NAPs as well 
as expansion and renewal of pre-existing NAPs.  In 1995, there were only 5 NAPs, MAE East, 
MAE West, NY (Sprint), Chicago (Ameritech), and Palo Alto (PacBell).  In 1999, there were 41 
NAPs in the United States (including 5 MAEs), and 40 European NAPs (including 2 MAEs) and 
27 Asia-Pacific NAPs.
6  Table 3 shows the capacity expansion of NAPs from 1997 to January 
2000.  The fifth column of Table 3 shows capacity in January 2000.  It is evident that there is 
                                                 
4 The NAPs run by MCI are called Metropolitan Area Exchanges (“MAEs”). 
5 In particular, interconnection at a NAP owned or controlled, for example by MCI, does not imply or require a 
barter (peering) or transit arrangement between UUNET and networks X and Y.
 
6 Source http://www.ep.net. 
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very significant spare capacity.      A partial list of NAPs in North America and the rest of the world 
is provided by the Exchange Point Network at http://www.ep.net/ep-main.html.
7  
 
The Transit and Peering Payment Methods for Connectivity 
Internet networks have contracts that govern the terms under which they pay each other 
for connectivity.  Payment takes two distinct forms, (i) payment in dollars for “transit”; and (ii) 
payment in kind, i.e., barter, called “peering.”  Connectivity arrangements among ISPs 
encompass a seamless continuum, including ISPs that rely exclusively on transit to achieve 
connectivity, ISPs that use only peering to achieve connectivity, and everything in between.  
Although there are differences between transit and peering in the specifics of the payments 
method, and transit includes services to the ISP not provided by peering, it should be made clear 
that these two are essentially alternative payment methods for connectivity.
8  The transport and 
routing that backbone networks offer do not necessarily differ depending on whether cash 
(transit) or barter (peering) is used for payment.  The same transport and routing between 
customers of the two networks can be obtained by purchase or through barter for other transport 
services.   
Under transit, a network X connects to network Y with a pipeline of a certain size, and 
pays network Y for allowing X to reach all Internet destinations.  Under transit, network X pays 
Y to reach not only Y and its peers, but also any other network, such as network Z by passing 
through Y, as in the diagram below. 
                                                 
7 The exchange point information net at http://www.ep.net/naps_na.html lists the following NAPs in North America: 
East Coast: ATL-NAP Atlanta; BNAP - Baltimore NAP; Louisville-nap.net; MAGPI - a Mid Atlantic Gigapop for 
Internet2; MassachusettsIX; NY6iX - A New York IPv6 exchange; NYIIX - New York International Internet 
Exchange (Telehouse); Nashville Regional Exchange Point; Nap of the Americas; MetroIX; Philadelphia Internet 
Exchange; Pittsburgh Internet Exchange; Research Triangle Park; Sprint NAP (Pennsauken NJ); Vermont ISP 
Exchange; Blacksburg Electronic Village - VA.  West Coast: AMAP - Anchorage Metropolitan Access Point; Ames 
Internet Exchange; COX - Central Oregon Internet Exchange; HIX - Hawaii Internet Exchange; LAIIX - Telehouse 
Los Angeles; LAAP - A Los Angeles Exchange, includes MAE-LA; Northwest Access Exchange - Portland ;OIX - 
Oregon Internet Exchange; PACIFIC WAVE - Pacific Wave Exchange; SBC-Oakland; SD-NAP - San Diego 
(Caida); SIX - Seattle Internet Exchange.  The South: New Mexico Internet Exchange; IX New Mexico; TTI - The 
Tucson Interconnect; Yellowstone RIE.  The Middle American Exchange Points: CMH-IX - Columbus Internet 
Exchange; D-MIX - Dayton OH; DIX - Denver Internet Exchange; IndyX - Indianapolis Data Exchange; Nashville 
CityNet; Ohio Exchange; RMIX Rocky Mountain Internet eXchange; SBC-Chicago 
STAR TAP (12 GigaPOP); St. Louis, Mo.; Utah REP.  Canada: BC Gigapop; CA/NAP Canada/Toronto Exchange; 
CANIX: Originally CA*net Sponsored; MIX - Montreal Internet Exchange; The Nova Scotia Internet eXchange; 
Ottawa Internet eXchange; Toronto Internet Exchange. 
8 Transit customers receive services, such as customer support, DNS services, etc., that peering networks do not 




Under peering, two interconnecting networks agree not pay each other for carrying the 
traffic exchanged between them as long as the traffic originates and terminates in the two 
networks.  Referring to the diagram above, if X and Y have a peering agreement, they exchange 
traffic without paying each other as long as such traffic terminating on X originates in Y, and 
traffic terminating on Y originates in X.  If Y were to pass to X traffic originating from a 
network Z that was not a customer of Y, Y would have to pay a transit fee to X (or get paid a 
transit fee by X), i.e., it would not be covered by the peering agreement between X and Y. 
Although the networks do not exchange money in a peering arrangement, the price of the 
traffic exchange is not zero.  If two networks X and Y enter into a peering agreement, it means 
that they agree that the cost of transporting traffic from X to Y and vice versa that is incurred 
within X is roughly the same as the cost of transporting traffic incurred within Y.  These two 
costs have to be roughly equal if the networks peer, but they are not zero.  
The decision as to whether interconnection takes the form of peering or transit payment is 
a commercial decision. Peering is preferred when the cost incurred by X for traffic from X to Y 
and Y to X is roughly the same as the cost incurred by Y for the same traffic.  If not, the 
networks will use transit.  As I will explain below, the decision of whether to peer or not depends 
crucially on the geographic coverage of the candidate networks.  
Generally, peering does not imply that the two networks should have the same size in 
terms of the numbers of ISPs connected to each network, or in terms of the traffic that each of 
the two networks generate.
9  If two networks, X and Y, are similar in terms of the types of users 
to whom they sell services, the amount of traffic flowing across their interconnection point(s) 
will be roughly the same, irrespective of the relative size of the networks.  For example, suppose 
that network X has ten ISPs and network Y has one ISP.  If all ISPs have similar features, the 
traffic flowing from X to Y is generally equal to the traffic flowing from Y to X.
10   
                                                 
9 For example, MCI WorldCom has peering arrangements with a number of smaller networks. See Letter from Sue 
D. Blumenfeld, Attorney for Sprint Corporation, and A. Richard Metzger, Jr., Attorney for MCI WorldCom, Inc. to 
Magalie Roman Salas, FCC, CC Docket No. 99-333 (dated Jan. 14, 2000) at page 20. 
10 Suppose the larger network has ten ISPs with ten web sites per ISP and a total of 1,000 users, and it interconnects 
with a smaller network with one ISP with ten web sites and a total of 100 users. For simplicity, suppose that every 
user visits every web site. Then the smaller network transmits 100 X 10 X 10 = 10,000 site-visits to the larger   5
What determines whether a peering arrangement is efficient for both networks is the cost 
of carrying the mutual traffic within each network.  This cost will depend crucially on a number 
of factors, including the geographic coverage of the two networks.  Even if the types of ISPs of 
the two networks are the same as in the previous example (and therefore the traffic flowing in 
each direction is the same), the cost of carrying the traffic can be quite different in network X 
from network Y.  For example, network X (with the ten ISPs) may cover a larger geographic 
area and have significantly higher costs per unit of traffic than network Y.  Then network X 
would not agree to peer with Y.  These differences in costs ultimately would determine the 
decision to peer (barter) or receive a cash payment for transport. 
Where higher costs are incurred by one of two interconnecting networks because of 
differences in the geographic coverage of each network, peering would be undesirable from the 
perspective of the larger network.  Similarly, one expects that networks that cover small 
geographic areas will only peer with each other.  Under these assumptions, who peers with 
whom is a consequence of the extent of a network’s geographic coverage, and may not have any 
particular strategic connotation.
11   
In summary, whether two interconnecting networks use peering (barter) or cash payment 
(transit) does not depend on the degree of competition among backbone services providers.  In 
particular, the presence of peering is not necessarily a sign of intense or weak competition nor 
would the replacement of peering by cash pricing necessarily be a sign of diminished or 
increased competition.  Moreover, as the analysis above shows, generally, an ISP’s decision not 
to peer reflects its assessment that the average costs of transport within one network are larger 
than the average costs of transport within the other network.  Thus, refusal to peer is not 
inherently an anti-competitive act; it can be a consequence of some networks being much larger 
than others in terms of geographic coverage. 
 
Conduct of Internet Backbone Service Providers 
 
Pricing of Transport Services in The Backbone Networks 
                                                                                                                                                             
network, and the larger network transmits 1,000 X 1 X 10 = 10,000 site-visits to the smaller network.  Thus, the 
traffic across networks of different sizes is the same if the types of ISPs and users are the same across networks. 
11 Milgrom et al. (2000) shows how peering (with no money changing hands) can emerge under some circumstances 
as an equilibrium in a bargaining model between backbones.   6
I first discuss business conduct of Internet backbone service providers.  Structural 
conditions for Internet backbone services (discussed in the next section) ensure negligible 
barriers to entry and expansion and easy conversion of other transport capacity to Internet 
backbone capacity.  As discussed in the next section, raw transport capacity as well as Internet 
transport capacity have grown dramatically in the last four years.  Transport capacity is a 
commodity because of its abundance. 
The business environment for Internet backbone services is competitive.  Generally, ISPs 
buying transport services face flexible transit contracts of relatively short duration.  Backbones 
do not impose exclusivity of service on their customers.  For example UUNET (MCI) does not 
require that it be the exclusive Internet transport provider to its ISP customers. 
Often an ISP buys from a backbone bandwidth of a certain capacity that allows it to 
connect to the whole Internet (through a “transit” payment).  The bandwidth capacity and speed 
of the connecting pipe vary widely and depend on the demand for transport that an ISP wants to 
buy from a particular backbone.  Price lists for various bandwidth capacities are printed in 
Boardwatch magazine.  The strength of competition among the various backbone providers is 
evidenced in the small or non-existent differences in the prices for various bandwidth capacities.  
For example, Table 4 shows the prices for AT&T and UUNET (MCI) for various bandwidth 
capacities as reported by the latest edition of Boardwatch magazine (August 1999).  Despite the 
fact that AT&T’s backbone business is significantly smaller than UUNET’s, their prices are 
identical for most bandwidths, and when they differ, the differences are very small.  Many other 
providers of various sizes have very similar prices as reported in Boardwatch magazine.
12 
As the expected growth of the Internet in the mid to late 1990’s of 400% a year in terms 
of bits transferred was not realized in the post 1999 period and instead a growth of only about 
100% a year was realized, transit prices fell.  As an example, Table 5 compares the AT&T prices 
for the same connectivity in 1999 and 2001. 
 
ISP Multihoming; Additional Demand Responsiveness to Price Changes 
ISPs are not locked-in by switching costs of any significant magnitude.  Thus, ISPs are in 
good position to change providers in response to any increase in price, and it would be very 
                                                                                                                                                             
   7
difficult for a backbone profitably to increase price.  Moreover, a large percentage of ISPs has 
formal agreements that allow them to route packets through several backbone networks and are 
able to control the way the traffic will be routed (multihoming).  Table 6 shows that, in 1999, 
additional (i.e., second or subsequent) connections sold to multihoming ISPs amounted to 43% 
of all ISP connections to backbones.  One of the reasons for the increase in multihoming is likely 
the decrease in the cost of multihoming.  The cost of customer routers that are required for ISP 
multihoming has decreased from $10,000 to $2,000 - $3,000.
13  An additional reason for an ISP 
to multihome is that multihoming increases the ability of the ISP to route its traffic to the lowest-
priced backbone, as discussed below.  
When an ISP reaches the Internet through multiple backbones, it has additional flexibility 
in routing its traffic through any particular backbone.  A multihoming ISP can easily reduce or 
increase the capacity with which it connects to any particular backbone in response to changes in 
prices of transit.  Thus, multihoming increases the firm-specific elasticity of demand of a 
backbone provider.  Therefore, multihoming severely limits the ability of any backbone services 
provider to profitably increase the price of transport.  Any backbone increasing the price of 
transport will face a significant decrease in the capacity bought by multihoming ISPs. 
Large Internet customers also use multiple ISPs, which is called “customer 
multihoming.”  They have chosen to avoid any limitation on their ability to switch traffic among 
suppliers even in the very shortest of runs.  Customer multihoming has similar effects as ISP 
multihoming in increasing the firm-specific elasticity of demand of a backbone provider and 
limiting the ability of any backbone services provider to profitably increase the price of 
transport. 
New technologies of content delivery that utilize distributed storage of web-based content 
on various locations on the Internet reduce the need for backbone network transport.  “Caching” 
stores locally frequently requested content.  “Mirroring” creates a replica of a web site.   
Intelligent content distribution, implemented, among others, by Akamai Technologies,
14 places 
its servers closest to the end users inside an ISP’s network.  Intelligent content distribution 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 As Boardwatch Magazine reports in the 1999 and subsequent editions, prices for the same connectivity were very 
comparable for a large array of services among large IBPs.  
13  Source: Boardwatch Magazine’s Directory of Internet Service Providers, 11
th Edition, 1999. 
14  Akamai was founded in 1998 and made a $234M initial public offering October 1999.  Akamai has industry 
relationships with AT&T, BT plc, DIGEX, Global Center, GTEI, Lycos, Microsoft, PSINet, Qwest, Real Networks, 
Telecom Italia, Teleglobe, Universo Online, UUNET, and Yahoo!, among others.   8
technology assesses the fastest route on the Internet for content access, and delivers content 
faster to end users.  Placing content delivery close to end users and optimizing content delivery 
through intelligent content distribution, caching, and mirroring reduces in effect the demand for 
Internet transport services and the ability of backbone providers to affect the transit price. 
 
2. Structural Conditions for Internet Backbone Services; Negligible Barriers to Entry and 
Expansion 
 
The Markets for Raw Transport Capacity and Other Inputs to Internet Transport Services 
Almost all Internet transport uses fiber-optic transmission capacity which is based on a 
well-known and easily available technology.
15  There are no significant barriers to entry in the 
supply of additional raw transmission capacity.  Fiber transmission capacity is essentially 
fungible, and the same physical networks can be used for the transmission of voice, Internet 
traffic, and data by using different protocols.  
Fiber that will not be needed by an Internet transport supplier can be leased or sold for 
non-Internet uses.  The same fiber and electronics are used for both circuit switched and packet 
switched networks which can each transport both voice and data. Before construction, the 
operator has a completely open choice between creating either a circuit switched or a packet 
switched network.  Only the interface differs between voice and data applications.  Once 
capacity is in place, there are small costs of converting from one use to the other.  Moreover, 
capacity can be upgraded in small steps so that fiber networks can respond flexibly to increasing 
capacity requirements. 
Fiber capacity has grown rapidly and is expected to grow for the indefinite future.   
Because there is always new capacity in the planning stage, no operator needs to consider 
switching the use of existing capacity.  As a result, fiber capacity is not in any way a barrier to 
entry in Internet transport.
16  
                                                 
15  The transport and switching technologies are available from firms that do not sell backbone transport or ISP 
services. 
16 In the early stages of Internet expansion and given the explosive growth that was anticipated then, the possibility 
of a future backbone capacity shortage may have bid up the value of firms with installed Internet backbone capacity 
and may explain the price that WorldCom paid for MFS and implicitly UUNET.  This should be seen in the context 
of a real options analysis.  See Economides (1999) and Hubbard and Lehr (2000)   9
In order to build or expand Internet backbone capacity, besides fiberoptic cable, networks 
need routers and switches.  Routers and switches are readily available from a variety of third 
party suppliers.  Fiber capacity can be leased, and there is no shortage of capacity that would 
constrain the ability of smaller networks or new entrants to expand capacity or enter the market.  
Fiber networks can add leased capacity or increase their capacity by deploying new technologies 
such as Dense Wave Division Multiplexing (“DWDM”).  The construction of fourth-generation 
fiberoptic networks, deploying the latest technology, promises an abundance of capacity that 
appears to be able to accommodate the very rapid growth in capacity demand that has been the 
hallmark of the Internet market to date.  
 
Ease of Expansion and Entry 
National, international, and regional long haul fiber-optic transmission capacity has 
increased very rapidly, both as a result of expansion of networks of incumbents, such as AT&T, 
MCI, Sprint, and GTE but also as a result of entry of a number of carriers that created new 
networks, including Quest, Level 3, Williams and others.  FCC’s Fiber Deployment Update 
reports that total fiber system route miles of interexchange carriers increased by two-thirds 
between 1994 and 1998.
17  After 1998, the FCC discontinued the publication of this report.  
However, data reported by Besen and Brenner (2000)
18 and Hogendorn (2004) supports the 
conclusion that the capacity of long haul fiber is increasing in an accelerated rate. 
As evidence of ease of entry, the number of North American ISPs more than tripled in the 
years 1996-1999 and has continued thereafter.  The number of North American backbone 
providers has grown almost fivefold in the same period.  These statistics are shown in tables 7 
and 8. 
Bandwidth and equipment costs have decreased and continue to decrease.  Hence, access 
to fiber capacity is unlikely to be an impediment to sellers wishing to upgrade their networks or 
to new competitors wishing to enter the market. 
                                                 
17 See Jonathan M. Kraushaar, Fiber Deployment Update: End of Year 1998, FCC, Industry Analysis Division, 
Common Carrier Bureau, Table 1.  
18  See Declaration of Stanley Besen and Steven Brenner, March 20, 2000.   10
 
Public Standards and Protocols on the Internet 
In markets where the incumbent has a proprietary standard and an entering rival must 
promote an incompatible alternative standard—as in operating systems for personal computers—
standards can be used to create a barrier to entry.  However, in markets where all rivals use the 
same public standard, no such barrier exists or can be created.  Rather, the use of a single 
standard can support unlimited numbers of rivals, as in the market for household fax and 
telephone appliances today.  
The Internet is based on open and public standards and protocols which are outside the 
control of any one of the incumbent network operators.  These are vital for keeping traffic 
running smoothly among the extraordinary number of networks comprising the Internet and the 
diverse mixture of hardware employed by different providers.  There is no danger that 
proprietary standards will emerge in the future since there are well-established mechanisms for 
extending Internet standards.  A proposed new Internet standard “undergoes a period of 
development and several iterations of review by the Internet community and revision based upon 
experience”
19 before it is adopted as a standard and published.  This whole process takes place 
under the auspices of the Internet Society, a non-profit body, is managed by the Internet 
Architecture Board and the Internet Engineering Steering Group, and conducted by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force.  In considering changes in standards, these groups require mandatory 




3. Potential for Anti-competitive Behavior on the Internet Backbone 
 
Some have proposed
21 that the existence of network effects creates a grave danger that 
the Internet backbone will quickly become monopolized once the largest Internet backbone 
provider becomes “large enough.”  Various theories have been proposed of how this could be 
                                                 
19  Scott Bradner, The Internet Standards Process, revision 3, Network Working Group (ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-
notes/rfc2026.txt), section 1.2. 
20 “No contribution that is subject to any requirement of confidentiality or any restriction on its dissemination may 
be considered in any part of the Internet Standards Process, and there must be no assumption of any confidentiality 
obligation with respect to any such contribution.” Id, section 10.2. 
21 See Cremer, Rey, and Tirole, (1998, 2000).    11
done.  I first discuss the general context in which network effects affect competition on the 
Internet, and subsequently discuss the specific theories. 
 
4. Network Externalities and the Internet 
 
Like any network, the Internet exhibits network externalities.  Network externalities are 
present when the value of a good or service to each consumer rises as more consumers use it, 
everything else being equal.
22  In traditional telecommunications networks, the addition of a 
customer to the network increases the value of a network connection to all other customers, since 
each of them can now make an extra call.  On the Internet, the addition of a user potentially 
 
1)  adds to the information that all others can reach;  
2)  adds to the goods available for sale on the Internet;  
3)  adds one more customer for e-commerce sellers; 
4)  adds to the collection of people who can send and receive e-mail or otherwise interact 
in through the Internet. 
 
Thus, the addition of an extra computer node increases the value of an Internet 
connection to each connection.  
In general, network externalities arise because high sales of one good make 
complementary goods more valuable.  Network externalities are present not only in traditional 
network markets, such as telecommunications, but also in many other markets.  For example, an 
IBM-compatible PC is more valuable if there are more compatible PCs sold because then there 
will be more software written and sold for such computers.  
In networks of interconnected networks, there are large social benefits from the 
interconnection of the networks and the use of common standards.  A number of networks of 
various ownership structures have harnessed the power of network externalities by using 
common standards.  Examples of interconnected networks of diverse ownership that use 
common standards include the telecommunications network, the network of fax machines, and 
                                                 
22  See Economides (1996), Farrell and Saloner (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1985), and Liebowitz and Margolis (1994, 
2002).   12
the Internet.  Despite the different ownership structures in these three networks, the adoption of 
common standards has allowed each one of them to reap huge network-wide externalities. 
For example, users of the global telecommunications network reap the network 
externalities benefits, despite its fragmented industry structure.  If telecommunications networks 
were not interconnected, consumers in each network would only be able to communicate with 
others on the same network. Thus, there are strong incentives for every network to interconnect 
with all other networks so that consumers enjoy the full extent of the network externalities of the 
wider network. 
The Internet has very significant network externalities.  As the variety and extent of the 
Internet’s offerings expand, and as more customers and more sites join the Internet, the value of 
a connection to the Internet rises.  Because of the high network externalities of the Internet, 
consumers on the Internet demand universal connectivity, that is, to be able to connect with 
every web site on the Internet and to be able to send electronic mail to anyone.  This implies that 
every network must connect with the rest of the Internet in order to be a part of it.   
The demand for universal connectivity on the Internet is stronger than the demand of a 
voice telecommunications customer to reach all customers everywhere in the world.  In the case 
of voice, it may be possible but very unlikely that a customer may buy service from a long 
distance company that does not include some remote country because the customer believes that 
it is very unlikely that he/she would be making calls to that country.  On the Internet however, 
one does not know where content is located.  If company A did not allow its customers to reach 
region B or customers of a different company C, customers of A would never be able to know or 
anticipate what content they would be missing.  Thus, consumers’ desire for Internet universal 
connectivity is stronger than in voice telecommunications.  Additionally, because connectivity 
on the Internet is two-way, a customer of company A would be losing exposure of his/her 
content (and the ability to send and receive e-mails) to region B and customers of company C.  It 
will be difficult for customer A to calculate the extent of the losses accrued to him/her from such 
actions of company A.  Thus, again, customers on the Internet require universal connectivity.
23   
                                                 
23 If universal connectivity were not offered by a backbone network, a customer or its ISP would have to connect 
with more than one backbone.  This would be similar to the period 1895-1930 when a number of telephone 
companies run disconnected networks.  Eventually most of the independent networks were bought by AT&T which 
had a dominant long distance network.  The refusal of AT&T to deal and interconnect with independents was 
effective because of three key reasons: (i) AT&T controlled the standards and protocols under which its network 
ran; (ii) long distance service was provided exclusively by AT&T in most of the United States; and (iii) the cost to a   13
The existence of common interconnection standards and protocols in the 
telecommunications and the network of fax machines has guaranteed that no service provider or 
user can utilize the existence of network externalities to create and use monopoly power.   
Similarly, the existence of common and public interconnection standards on the Internet 
guarantees that no service provider or user can utilize the existence of network externalities to 
create and use monopoly power based on proprietary standards.  With competitive organization 
of the Internet’s networks, the rising value is shared between content providers and 
telecommunications services providers (in the form of profits) and end users (in the form of 
consumer surplus). 
 
Pro-Competitive Consequences of Network Externalities 
The presence of network externalities does not generally imply the existence of 
monopoly power.  Where there are network externalities, adding connections to other networks 
and users adds value to a network, so firms have strong incentives to interconnect fully and to 
maintain interoperability with other networks.  Thus, network externalities can act as a strong 
force to promote competition for services based on interconnected networks.
24  For example, 
various manufacturers compete in producing and selling fax machines that conform to the same 
technical standards and are connected to the ever-expanding fax network.  It would be 
unthinkable that a manufacturer, however large its market share, would decide to produce fax 
machines for a different fax network that would be incompatible with the present one.  In 
contrast, firms would like to conform to existing standards and fully interconnect to a network so 
that they reap the very large network externalities of the network.  
The incentive to interconnect and to conform to the same standard applies similarly to 
competitive firms as it applies to firms with market power.  Although, as in other markets, firms 
involved in network businesses may sometimes have market power, that power does not arise 
automatically from the network, even in the presence of externalities. 
                                                                                                                                                             
customer of connecting to both AT&T and an independent was high.  None of these reasons apply to the Internet.  
The Internet is based on public protocols.  No Internet backbone has exclusive network coverage of a large portion 
of the United States.  Finally, connecting to more than one backbone (multi-homing) is a common practice by many 
ISPs and does not require big costs.  And ISPs can interconnect with each other through secondary peering as 
explained later.  Thus, the economic factors that allowed AT&T to blackmail independents into submission in the 
first three decades of the 20
th century are reversed in today’s Internet and therefore would not support a profitable 
refusal to interconnect by any backbone.  
24 See also Faulhaber (2004)   14
 
Conditions under which Network Externalities May Inhibit Competition 
In markets with network externalities, firms may create bottleneck power by using 
proprietary standards.  A firm controlling a standard needed by new entrants to interconnect their 
networks with the network of the incumbent may be in a position to exercise market power.
25  
Often a new technology will enter the market with competing incompatible standards.   
Competition among standards may have the snowball characteristic attributed to network 
externalities.  
For example, VHS and Beta, two incompatible proprietary standards for video cassette 
recorders (“VCRs”), battled for market share in the early 1980s.  Because Sony, the sponsor of 
the Beta standard, chose a pricing and licensing strategy that did not trigger the snowball effect, 
VHS was the winner.  In particular, Sony refused to license its Beta standard, while VHS was 
widely licensed.  Even though VHS was the winning standard, the market for VCRs did not 
become a monopoly since there are a number of suppliers of VHS-type video equipment.  Thus, 
a standard may be licensed freely or at a low cost, and therefore the existence of a proprietary 
standard does not preclude competition. Moreover, in many cases a sufficiently open licensing 
policy will help to win the standards battle, and may therefore be in the interest of the owner of 
the standard to freely license even its proprietary standards.
26 
Economics literature has established that using network externalities to affect market 




1)  Networks use proprietary standards; 
2)  No customer needs to reach nodes of or to buy services from more than one 
proprietary network; 
3)  Customers are captives of the network to which they subscribe and cannot change 
providers easily and cheaply. 
 
                                                 
25 See Economides (2003). 
26 See Economides (1996b). 
27  See Economides (1996a, 1989), Farrell and Saloner (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1985).    15
First, without proprietary standards, a firm does not have the opportunity to create the 
bottleneck.  Second, if proprietary standards are possible, the development of proprietary 
standards by one network isolates its competitors from network benefits, which then accrue only 
to one network.  The value of each proprietary network is diminished when customers need to 
buy services from more than one network.  Third, the more consumers are captive and cannot 
easily and economically change providers, the more valuable is the installed base to any 
proprietary network.  The example of snowballing network effects I mentioned—VHS against 
Beta —fulfills these three conditions.  I show next that these conditions fail in the context of the 
Internet backbone. 
 
5. Network Externalities and Competition on the Internet 
 
Conditions Necessary for the Creation of Bottlenecks Fail on the Internet 
The Internet fails to fulfill any of the three necessary conditions under which a network 
may be able to leverage network externalities and create a bottleneck.  First, there are no 
proprietary standards on the Internet, so the first condition fails. The scenario of standards wars 
is not at all applicable to Internet transport, where full compatibility, interconnection, and 
interoperability prevail.  For Internet transport, there are no proprietary standards.  There is no 
control of any technical standard by service providers and none is in prospect.  Internet transport 
standards are firmly public property.
28  As a result, any seller can create a network complying 
with the Internet standards -- thereby expanding the network of interconnected networks -- and 
compete in the market.   
In fact, the existence and expansion of the Internet and the relative decline of proprietary 
networks and services, such as CompuServe, can be attributed to the conditions of 
interoperability and the tremendous network externalities of the Internet.  America On Line 
(“AOL”), CompuServe, Prodigy, MCI and AT&T folded their proprietary electronic mail and 
other services into the Internet.  Microsoft, thought to be the master of exploiting network 
externalities, made the error of developing and marketing the proprietary Microsoft Network 
(“MSN”).  After that product failed to sell, Microsoft re-launched Microsoft Network as an 
                                                 
28  See Kahn and Cerf (1999) and Bradner, The Internet Standards Process, revision 3, Network Working Group 
(ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2026.txt), section 1.2.    16
Internet Service Provider, adhering fully to the public Internet standard.  This is telling evidence 
of the power of the Internet standard and demonstrates the low likelihood that any firm can take 
control of the Internet by imposing its own proprietary standard. 
Second, customers on the Internet demand universal connectivity, so the second condition 
fails.  Users of the Internet do not know in advance what Internet site they may want to contact 
or to whom they might want to send e-mail.  Thus, Internet users demand from their ISPs and 
expect to receive universal connectivity.  This is the same expectation that users of telephones, 
mail, and fax machines have: that they can connect to any other user of the network without 
concern about compatibility, location, or, in the case of telephone or fax, any concern about the 
manufacturer of the appliance, the type of connection (wireline or wireless) or the owners of the 
networks over which the connection is made.  Because of the users’ demand for universal 
connectivity, ISPs providing services to end users or to web sites must make arrangements with 
other networks so that they can exchange traffic with any Internet customer. 
Third, there are no captive customers on the Internet, so the third condition fails, for a 
number of reasons:  
ISPs can easily and with low cost migrate all or part of their transport traffic to other network 
providers; 
 
1)  Many ISPs already purchase transport from more than one backbone to guard against 
network failures and for competitive reasons (ISP “multihoming”); 
2)  Many large web sites / providers use more than one ISP for their sites (“customer 
multihoming”); 
3)  Competitive pressure from their customers makes ISPs agile and likely to respond 
quickly to changes in conditions in the backbone market. 
 
Bottlenecks Such as the Ones of the Local Exchange Telecommunications Network Do Not 
Exist on the Internet 
There are significant differences between local telephone networks and the Internet 
which result in the existence of bottlenecks in local telephone markets and lack of bottlenecks on 
the Internet.  Until the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the local telephone 
company had a legal franchise monopoly over local telephony in its territory in most States.    17
Most importantly, the local telephone company monopolizes the fixed wireline connection to 
customers, especially the residential ones, thereby controlling the bottleneck for access to 
customers.  Such a bottleneck does not exist on the Internet backbone.  A number of reasons 
contribute to this:  
 
1)  the cost of connecting an ISP to the rest of the Internet is very low compared to the 
cost of connecting every house to local telephone service;  
2)  the location of an ISP is not predetermined, but can be placed most conveniently 
within a geographic area; 
3)  the elasticity of supply for Internet transport services is high, that is, there are no 
barriers to expansion; 
4)  there are negligible barriers to entry on the Internet;  
 
Internet demand growth and expansion are exponential, driven by expanding market and 
geographic penetration and by the introduction of new applications.
29  
The only bottleneck in the Internet arises out of the control of the first/last mile of the 
local telecommunications network, by incumbent local exchange carriers, since this first/last 
mile is used by the majority of users to connect to the Internet. 
In summary, an analysis of network externalities shows that network effects cannot create 
barriers to entry for new networks on the Internet or barriers to expansion of existing ones.  I also 
showed that network effects on the Internet do not create a tendency to dominate the market or 
tip it toward monopoly.  On the contrary, network effects are a pro-competitive force on the 
Internet, providing strong incentives to incumbents to interconnect with new entrants.  In the 
next sections, I discuss in detail competition on the Internet. 
 
6. Strategies that a Large IBP Might Pursue 
 
There are two main ways in which a large Internet backbone connectivity provider could 
attempt to exercise market power and harm consumers:    18
 
1)  Price increases.  It could raise the price of network services across-the-board to all 
customers, including replacing peering with transit sold at a high price; alternatively, 
it could selectively increase price to one or few networks; 
2)  Raising rivals’ costs or degrading interconnection without changing price(s).  It 
could selectively degrade the quality of interconnections with competing networks, in 
an effort to make their networks less attractive and divert traffic to itself. 
 
As I explain below, neither of these courses of action is likely to be profitable on the 
Internet backbone. 
 
Raising the Price of Transport 
The simplest exercise of market power by a large firm would be to raise the price of its 
transport services.  In addition, the company might refuse to continue peering with some 
networks and to charge them transit fees instead.  The ability of a company to profitably de-peer 
other networks is equivalent to the ability of a company to increase the price of transport.  De-
peering does not mean cutting off a customer from the network or charging an infinite price to 
the customer; it does not mean refusal to deal.  A price increase would create profit opportunities 
for the large IBP’s rivals in the transport market, and is also likely to induce entry. 
Internet backbone providers sell transport as a bandwidth of a certain capacity that allows 
an ISP to connect to the whole Internet.  If a large Internet backbone connectivity provider were 
to increase the prices it charges to ISPs for such capacity, ISPs would promptly switch to other 
backbone providers.  Thus, an increase in transit price by a large IBP would decrease its sales 
sufficiently to make such a price increase unprofitable. 
ISP connections to multiple backbones are very common.  Forty three percent of all ISP 
connections to backbones were sold as additional connections to ISPs who connected to more 
than one backbone.  A multihoming ISP can easily and at a low cost limit the size of its 
purchases from an Internet Backbone Provider (“IBP”) that increases the price of transport.   
Thus, the presence of multihoming increases the firm-specific elasticity of demand of IBP 
                                                                                                                                                             
29  Demand grows yearly at about 100%. The number of North American ISPs more than tripled in 3 years.  Up to 
2003, demand growth has been over-estimated as 400% per year both by the U.S. government and most providers of   19
transport services and creates a bigger demand response to IBP price increases.  This makes it 
even more likely that the firm-specific demand response to a price increase will be sufficiently 
negative to render a contemplated price increase unprofitable. 
If the large Internet backbone connectivity provider’s strategy were to impose equal 
increases in transport costs on all customers, the response of other backbone providers and ISPs 
will be to reduce the traffic for which they buy transit from the large IBP, and to instead reroute 
traffic and purchase more transit from each other.  Thus, in response to a price increase by the 
large Internet backbone connectivity provider, other IBPs and ISPs reduce the traffic for which 
they buy transit from the large IBP down to the minimum level necessary to reach ISPs that are 
exclusively connected to the large IBP.  All other IBPs and ISPs exchange all other traffic with 
each other bypassing the large IBP network.  
Figures 3 and 4 show the typical reaction of an increase in the price of a large IBP, and 
illustrate why the strategy of increasing price is unprofitable.  Consider, for example, a situation 
where, prior to the price increase, four ISPs (1 to 4) purchase transit from IBP 0 which considers 
increasing its price.  Two of these ISPs (ISP 2 and ISP 3) peer with each other.  This is illustrated 
in Figure 3.  ISP 1 and ISP 4 buy transit capacity for all their traffic to IBP 0 and the other three 
ISPs.  ISP 2 and ISP 3 buy transit capacity for all their traffic to ISP 0, ISP 1 and ISP 4. 
Now suppose that, IBP 0 increases its transit price.  In response, ISP 1 and ISP 4 decide 
to reduce the traffic for which they buy transit from IBP 0, and instead to re-route some of their 
traffic and purchase more transit from ISP 2 and ISP 3 respectively.  See Figure 3.  Because of 
the peering relationship between ISP 2 and ISP 3, all traffic from ISP 1 handed to ISP 2 will 
reach ISP 3 as well as ISP 4 who is a customer of ISP 3.  Similarly, by purchasing transit from 
ISP 3, ISP 4 can reach all the customers of ISP 1, ISP 2 and ISP 3.  Thus, in response to the price 
increase of IBP 0, each of the ISPs 1, 2, 3, and 4 will reduce the amount of transit purchased 
from the IBP 0.  Specifically, each of the ISPs buys from IBP 0 only capacity sufficient to handle 
traffic to the customers of network 0.  This may lead to a considerable loss in revenues for IBP 0, 
rendering the price increase unprofitable.  The big beneficiaries of the price increase of IBP 0 are 
peering ISPs 2 and 3 who now start selling transit to ISPs 1 and 4 respectively and become larger 
networks. 
                                                                                                                                                             
backbone connectivity, including MCI-WorldCom.    20
In response to a price increase by the large IBP, rivals would be able to offer their 
customers universal connectivity at profitable prices below the large IBP’s prices.  In the 
scenario described in the example above, market forces, responding to a price increase by a large 
network, re-route network traffic so that it is served by rival networks, except for the traffic to 
and from the ISPs connected exclusively with the large network. The rivals purchase the 
remaining share from the large IBP in order to provide universal connectivity.  Thus, the rivals’ 
blended cost would permit them to profitably offer all transport at prices lower than the large 
IBP’s prices, but above cost.   
A direct effect of the increase in price by the large network is that: (i) ISPs who were 
originally exclusive customers of the large IBP would shift a substantial portion of their transit 
business to competitors; and (ii) ISPs that were not exclusive customers of the large IBP would 
also shift a significant share of their transit business to competitors’ networks, keeping the 
connection with the large IBP only for traffic for which alternate routes do not exist or for cases 
of temporary failure of the rivals’ networks. 
 
Discriminatory Price Increases Directed Simultaneously Against All Backbone Rivals 
Here I consider the possibility that a large IBP might try to displace its rivals by charging 
them more than it charges ISPs who are not rivals in the transport business.  I believe that this 
form of price discrimination is particularly unlikely.  Of all customers, rivals in the transport 
business—major backbones and smaller regional networks—are the best positioned to avoid the 
use of the large IBP’s network if it is more expensive than the alternatives.  Even the smaller 
rivals are large enough that the transactions costs of establishing alternative connections are 
unimportant in relation to the cost increases for transport that could be avoided by making new 
deals. 
 
Raising Rivals’ Costs and Degrading Connectivity 
Alternatively one may consider the possibility that the large IBP would find it profitable 
to raise the non-price costs of rivals by reducing the connectivity it provides with other IBPs.
30  
The first observation regarding the “raising rivals’ cost” or “degradation” strategy applied to 
clients is that as a matter of economics, it is always preferable to a firm to increase price rather 
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than increase the non-price costs of rivals. A firm can choose a price increase that will have the 
same effect as increasing the costs (or reducing the benefits) of its clients, and it is able to collect 
extra revenue through the price increase while if it just degrades the product it receives no extra 
revenue.  Another difference from the traditional raising rivals cost theory is that it on the 
Internet backbone often imposing a quality decrease on a rival simultaneously results in a quality 
decrease on the perpetrator.  This is because the quality degradation affects both the services 
demanded by the target network (its clients connecting to the perpetrators network) as well as the 
services demanded by perpetrators’ network (its clients connecting to the target networks).  As I 
discuss in detail below, because of the network feature of connectivity, such a degradation 
cannot be confined to the target but also simultaneously affects negatively the perpetrator. 
 
7. Terminating Interconnection Simultaneously with all Rivals (Refusal to Deal)  
 
I first consider the extreme case in which a large IBP terminates interconnection with all 
rivals.  This setup is equivalent to the large IBP increasing the rivals’ price to infinity if they 
were to interconnect with it. 
Termination by the large IBP of interconnection with a network customer has a bilateral 
effect.  It prevents the other network’s customers from reaching any customer of the large IBP 
and it prevents the large IBP’s customers from reaching any customers of the other network.  
Whatever the relative sizes of the two networks, customers of both networks are harmed.  If the 
large IBP’s network has more customers than the interconnecting network, then the termination 
strategy will affect the large IBP’s network as much or more than the interconnecting network. 
Termination of interconnection would deny the large IBP’s customers the universal 
connectivity sought by every customer, and would have devastating effects for the large IBP.  Its 
customers -- larger web sites and the ISPs specializing in end user services and web hosting -- 
would seek new transport providers to make up for the large IBP’s inability to deliver universal 
connectivity.  The loss of business is likely to make termination of interconnection highly 
unprofitable. 
This is a good demonstration of the pro-competitive effects of network externalities in the 
Internet.  Each network, including a large network, has a more valuable product if it 
interconnects with other networks.  Termination of interconnection would severely lower the   22
value of the large network’s service because it would shrink the connectivity the company 
offered.  
 
8. Degrading Interconnection Simultaneously with all Rivals 
 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that a large IBP would degrade interconnection with 
all rivals without terminating service.
31  However, a large IBP could always make more profit by 
charging more for interconnection than by offering poor service.  There is always a price level 
that has the equivalent harmful effect on customers as a program of degradation. The higher 
charge puts money in the seller’s pocket immediately; degradation does not.  Because, as I have 
concluded, a large IBP would not find it profitable to raise transport charges, it follows 
immediately that it would suffer even more from degrading service.  
In a similar vein to the earlier discussion, even if a large IBP decided to degrade 
interconnections rather than raise price, degrading interconnections would impose a cost on it 
that is comparable to the cost imposed on the rivals.  In total, the large IBP’s customers would 
experience the same level of degradation in terms of the traffic sent to, or received from, the 
other networks as would the other networks’ customers.  
Some have argued that the effects of degraded interconnections would be less severe for a 
large IBP than for the other networks because of the large IBP’s size.  In this line of argument, if 
traffic is isotropic,
32 a large number of Internet interactions will be within the network of the 
large IBP, and these interactions will be unaffected by degradation of interconnection.  
According to this theory, the rest of the Internet networks (with the smaller total number of 
customers if the large IBP has more than 50% of Internet customers) will suffer more than the 
larger network; it follows that the large IBP can then attract the customers of other networks.
33 
This argument is based on the assumption that Internet users do not require universal 
connectivity.  This, however, is factually incorrect.  Internet users demand to be able to reach 
every node of the Internet, in a similar way that telecommunications customers demand that they 
be able to reach anyone connected to the telecommunications network, no matter where the 
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32 Isotropic traffic is generated when every user initiates the same number and type of Internet interactions with 
every other user. 
33 Hausman (2000) at ¶53.   23
receiving party is located, which local exchange carrier he/she subscribes to, and who carries the 
long distance call.   
Since users demand universal connectivity on the Internet, no network, however large, 
can afford not to offer universal connectivity.  Therefore, no network would decide to degrade 
connections with the rest of the Internet networks unless the degrading network was certain that 
all ISPs not connected to it would immediately react to the degradation by instantaneously 
switching to the degrading network.  This instantaneous switching is extremely unlikely to 
happen.  Instead, many ISPs would reduce rather than increase use of a network that is degrading 
the quality of interconnections for a significant amount of Internet traffic.  And, as long as there 
are ISPs who have not switched to the degrading network, all customers of the degrading 
network suffer.  Each one of these customers of the degrading network is receiving connectivity 
significantly below his expectations of universal connectivity, and is now willing to pay less for 
it.  Thus, the loss in value from degradation is comparable on both sides of the degraded 
interconnections, and can in fact be higher for the larger network.  This means that a large 
network can only harm its rivals by harming itself by just as much or more. 
Degradation of interconnections, like termination of interconnections, sacrifices the 
benefits of network externalities.  It would result in a loss of value in the large IBP’s Internet 
businesses because it would limit its customers’ ability to interact with the rest of the Internet.  A 
rational business would not take this step.  Because there are limited switching costs and 
negligible barriers to expansion and entry, transport customers would switch to other networks or 
new entrants rather than tolerate a degraded interconnection and alienate their customers.   
Networks monitor the quality of service aggressively on behalf of their end users and web-site 
customers, and they are able to identify and react to problems that would result from deliberate 
degradation of interconnection. 
 
9. Sequential Attacks on Rivals 
 
Some authors have claimed that although a raising-rivals’-costs strategy is unprofitable 
against all rivals, it would be profitable if applied sequentially to one rival at a time.
34  In this 
line of thought, a large IBP would degrade interconnections by targeting rivals and ISP 
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customers one after the other.  Cremer et al. (2000) raise a number of anti-competitive concerns 
for networks that obey the following assumptions: 
 
1)  consumers do not demand universal connectivity; 
2)  there is an installed base of clients (ISPs) of Internet backbone networks who cannot 
migrate to other providers. 
 
Under these assumptions, Cremer et al. (2000) argue, (a) a large IBP network has an 
incentive to introduce incompatibilities and to degrade interconnection with one rival but not 
with all rivals; (b) even small differences in network size will lead to a spiral of ever increasing 
dominance by a larger IBP network, since dominance is defined by size; (c) large IBP networks 
will refuse to cooperate with small networks; and (d) in the case where switching costs are low, 
large IBP networks will still be able to dominate small networks.
35 
The Internet violates the assumptions of Cremer et al., as I describe below.  And, since 
the fundamental assumptions of Cremer et al. diverge in fundamental ways from the reality of 
the Internet, the conclusions of Cremer et al. do not apply to competition on the Internet.  These 
differences are summarized in Table 9.  
The claim of Cremer et al. that a large IBP network will degrade interconnection with a 
targeted rival is empirically invalid, as explained in detail below.  The fact that such behavior has 
not occurred on the Internet backbone despite significant differences in market shares among the 
various backbone providers should be sufficient proof that Cremer et al. are discussing a 
different network from the Internet.  Moreover, on the Internet we have observed a trend in the 
opposite direction, i.e., toward interconnection and full compatibility.  Proprietary networks that 
preceded the commercial Internet, some dominant in their realm, such as AOL, CompuServe, 
Prodigy, MCI Mail, AT&T Mail, and MSN chose not to remain incompatible networks, but 
instead accepted full compatibility as parts of the Internet. 
The results of Cremer et al. are indeed extremely sensitive to variations in the 
assumptions made.  The assumption that ISPs are not allowed to migrate to other backbones, 
which is presented by Cremer et al. as “conservative,” is not only unsubstantiated but also 
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critical to support its claim of dominance of a large IBP network and of degradation of 
interconnection. When consumer migration is allowed within the framework of the Cremer et al., 
there is no dominance or “snowballing.” I show in the Appendix that, with exactly the same 
assumptions of Cremer et al. except now allowing customer migration, the market equilibrium 
shows no network dominance by any firm and no network has an incentive to degrade 
interconnection. 
Cremer et al. also state that multihoming will not diminish the incentives or ability of a 
dominant firm to engage in serial degradation. They base this on an unrealistic network model 
setup. In Cremer et al.'s targeted degradation model, a large IBP network (network 1) cuts 
interconnection with network 3, while the only other remaining IBP network (network 2) 
interconnects with both networks 1 and 3, but is prevented (by assumption) from offering transit 
to the targeted network 3.
36  Cremer et al. allow for multihoming only between networks 1 and 3; 
they do not allow multihoming across other networks. Thus, multihoming a-la-Cremer et al. 
shields some customers of network 3 from the effects of targeted degradation but has no other 
effect. In the reality of the Internet, multihoming is available to customers of all networks, and 
large percentages of customers of all networks utilize it.  If the interconnection between 
networks 1 and 3 were severed: (i) customers of network 1 that multihome with network 2 would 
shift their traffic to network 2 to gain access to network 3, thus reducing the capacity they would 
buy from network 1, causing the targeted degradation to be even less profitable for network 1; 
(ii) customers that multihome with all three networks would also shift their traffic to network 2, 
since network 2 is the only one that provides universal connectivity; and (iii) customers of 
network 3 that multihome with network 2 would increase the capacity of transit they buy from 
network 2, so that they are able to gain access to network 1. Thus, in the real Internet, the 
existence of multihoming: (i) makes targeted degradation even less profitable for the targeting 
network since it results in a steeper demand response; and (ii) makes the non-degraded 
network(s) stronger competitors of the targeting network. In conclusion, the presence of 
multihoming makes it even less likely that targeted degradation will ever occur.  Table 10 
summarizes the differences in the results when customer migration is allowed. 
                                                 
36 The assumption of Cremer et al. that network 2 (or other third networks in a more general setting) will not sell 
transit to the targeted network is totally unreasonable. 
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A key conclusion of Cremer et al. (2000) is that the largest network will use targeted 
degradation of rival networks.  But, targeted degradation is unprofitable for a large network that 
would initiate it because: 
 
1)  ISP clients of the targeted network are likely to switch to third IBP networks that are 
unaffected by the degradation; it is very unlikely that any will switch to the degrading 
IBP network because it is itself degraded and cannot offer universal connectivity; 
there is no demand reward to the large IBP network; 
2)  Degradation of interconnection hurts all the ISP customers of the targeting IBP 
network as well, since they lose universal connectivity; these customers of the large 
network would now be willing to pay less to the large network; this leads to 
significant revenue and profit loss; 
3)  After losing universal connectivity, customers of the large IBP network are likely to 
switch to other networks that are unaffected by degradation and can provide universal 
connectivity; this leads to even further revenue and profit loss for the degrading 
network; 
4)  Multihoming ISPs would purchase less capacity from the large IBP network, or even 
terminate their relationship with the large network, which, through its own actions 
sabotages their demand for universal connectivity; this further reduces demand and 
profits for the degrading network; the same argument applies to multihoming 
customers of ISPs 
5)  As the large IBP network pursues target after target, its customers face continuous 
quality degradation while the target's customers face only temporary degradation; this 
would result in further customer and profit losses for the large IBP network; 
6)  Prospective victims would seek alternative suppliers in advance of being targeted by 
the large IBP network; the scheme cannot play out the way it is proposed; 
7)  The degradation scheme is implausible in its implementation. How large do networks 
need to be to become serial killers? Why have we not observed this behavior at all? 
8)  There is no enduring change to the number of competitors in a market caused by 
serial degradation in a market with negligible entry barriers; the eliminated rival is 
likely to be replaced by another.   27
 
I explain briefly the reasons why I believe that the strategy of targeted degradation would 
be self-defeating.  First, degrading interconnections with networks that have an alternative way 
to send and receive traffic through a second network connection with another network would 
lead to a quick response by the rivals of routing almost all of their traffic through the second 
network, and would therefore be undesirable to a large network.  Figures 3 and 4 above 
illustrated the re-routing of traffic in response to a price increase by a large IBP.  The response of 
competitors and clients of an IBP that degraded interconnection would be very similar to the 
responses of rivals and clients to a price increase by the large IBP as shown in Figures 3 and 4.  
Moreover a target network is likely to enter into new peering and transit arrangements with other 
networks that would further divert traffic from the degrading IBP.  The target network could buy 
transit from other networks whose connectivity with the large IBP’s network is intact, and avoid 
all degradation problems.  Thus, in response to degradation, traffic is routed away from the 
degrading IBP, the culprit loses customers, traffic and profits. 
Second, as explained earlier, inequality in size does not imply inequality in the value of 
the damage sustained by two interconnecting networks as a result of a degraded interconnection.  
Suppose that the large IBP degraded its interconnection with a much smaller network.  If traffic 
were spread evenly across all customers (end users and web sites), the reduction in service 
quality experienced by each of the large IBP’s customers may be smaller than the reduction in 
service quality experienced by each of the smaller rival’s customers.  Some argue that this 
implies that ISPs connected to the targeted rival would then switch to the large IBP, and 
therefore the degradation strategy is “successful” in attracting customers to the large IBP.  This 
argument is based on the assumption that Internet users do not require universal connectivity, an 
assumption that is factually incorrect.  Since Internet users demand universal connectivity, no 
network would decide to degrade a target network unless the degrading network was certain that 
all ISPs of the target network would immediately react to the degradation by instantaneously 
switching away from the target network.  This instantaneous switching is extremely unlikely to 
happen.  The target network is likely to establish new peering and transit relationships with other 
networks and utilize its multihoming arrangements to divert traffic away from the degraded 
interconnection and minimize the effect on its customers.  After all, since the target network is 
the only one with degraded connectivity to the large IBP’s network, the target network can easily   28
buy transit service from other networks which have full connectivity to the large IBP’s network 
and avoid all degradation problems.  And, as long as there are ISPs of the target network who 
have not switched to the degrading network, the users of the ISPs connected to the large IBP will 
suffer significantly as a result of the degradation.  If the large IBP were to degrade its 
interconnection to a target network, the customers of the large IBP will be willing to pay less for 
the degraded service, and the large IBP would lose profits, even if the degradation strategy were 
“successful” in attracting customers to it.  After all, a larger number of customers of the large 
IBP would experience a reduced service quality than the potential number of customers that the 
large IBP could attract from the small target ISP.
37  Thus, the commercial impact of the serial 
degradation on the large IBP in terms of profit loss would be significant.  
Third, the large IBP’s customers are anything but captives.  Business and individual end 
users and web site operators are sensitive to the quality of the service they receive.  The large 
IBP could not use its customer base as a tool for harming rivals because it would lose the 
customer base in the process.  Customers would switch to another network in response to a 
reduction in service quality.  A degraded interconnection reduces the quality of the service that 
the large IBP’s customers receive, and if they could not get reliable and quick access to popular 
web sites served by the network rival whose connection was degraded, these customers would 
move to other networks whose connection with the victimized network was unimpaired.   
Therefore, picking rivals one by one would not reduce the damage of this strategy to the large 
IBP. 
Fourth, as I have discussed earlier, a significant number of end-user service providers 
have connections with more than one transport provider and most large content providers have 
connections with a number of networks.  Even if the serial killer argument were correct for 
traffic that went to ISPs that were exclusively connected with the large IBP, and somehow the 
large IBP benefited from degradation of quality to these ISPs, the degradation of quality of the 
large IBP network would lead multiple connection ISPs to move traffic away from the large IBP 
and terminate their relationship with the large IBP. 
                                                 
37 As explained earlier, even if the merged company is “successful” in making customers leave the target network, it 
is likely that most of the customers leaving the target will not switch to the merged company because of the merged 
company’s network also faces a quality degradation. 
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Fifth, by targeting rivals sequentially (rather than all at once), the large IBP might limit 
the size of the damage to itself at any point in time, but it would be just as large in total.  
Moreover, over a period of time, the serial degradation strategy hurts more a customer of the 
large IBP than a customer of any targeted network. 
If the serial degradation strategy is pursued, the large IBP’s customers would experience 
constant problems in connecting to web sites not served by the company, while each victim 
would face only temporary quality degradation.  For example, suppose that, over a period of a 
year, a large network sequentially degrades interconnections for 4 months for each of 3 smaller 
competitors.  Then customers of the larger network will experience degradation over the course 
of all 12 months, but customers of each of the smaller networks will not experience degradation 
for 8 months of the year.  The continuous quality degradation experienced by customers of the 
larger network is at least as great as that occasionally experienced by customers of smaller 
(target) networks. 
Sixth, the serial killer scenario assumes that the purchasers of Internet transport services 
have a passive response to the plan as it unfolds.  After each victim falls, they switch their 
transport business to the predator, knowing perfectly well that the ultimate result will be higher 
prices for transport services.  In fact, the rational response would be the opposite. As the plan 
developed, the prospective victims would take action to avoid becoming victims at all.  They 
would seek alternative suppliers for the majority of their Internet connectivity, cutting back 
purchases from the large IBP to the bare minimum. 
Seventh, the “serial killer” scenario is totally implausible in its implementation.  Its 
proponents have left a number of key questions unanswered.  For example, for how long will the 
large IBP target a network before switching to its next victim?  How does the large IBP hide 
from its customers the increasing degradation in its service to them?  How large do networks 
need to be to find it desirable to be serial killers?  Why have we not observed this behavior at all?  
How do the proponents of the serial killer theory explain why the degradation of connectivity 
would happen in the future but has never happened up to now? 
Eighth, the serial degradation strategy would be impossible to execute in practice, 
because new networks are coming into existence all the time.  By the time that the large IBP had 
degraded interconnection with one network, the number of alternatives will have multiplied.  In a   30
market with negligible barriers to entry, there is no gain to eliminating one set of rivals because 
they will be replaced by another. 
Ninth, I have stressed the role of customer mobility in maintaining competition in 
Internet transport.  Larger customers already have multiple connections to the Internet and all 
customers can switch suppliers easily.  Many ISPs have multiple connections to IBPs.   
Advocates of the serial killer scenario have suggested that customer mobility may contribute to 
the potential success of the serial killer strategy, because the customers of the targeted IBP will 
abandon that IBP quickly and fully.
38  This theory is incorrect because it disregards the 
incentives of multihoming customers and of other customers of the large IBP to switch their 
traffic away from the large IBP in response to the degradation. 
A multi-homing ISP who is a customer of the large IBP (which initiates the connectivity 
degradation of the small IBP in the serial killer scenario) will also observe the degradation.  Such 
an ISP will have an incentive to switch most of its traffic away from the two affected IBPs (large 
and small) to a third network.  The ISP that switches traffic to a third network will now buy less 
transit from the large IBP.  This provides incentives for the large IBP not to engage in 
degradation.  The existence of multihoming implies that ISPs can easily reduce the amount of 
transit they buy from the large IBP in response to even small degradation of quality.  Thus, 
multihoming decreases the incentive for a large IBP to degrade connectivity. 
In conclusion, serial degradation is no more likely than simultaneous degradation or price 
discrimination—it would lower, not raise, the large IBP’s profits. 
 
10. Concluding Remarks 
 
The commercial Internet is one the most important innovations in telecommunications 
and computing of the last 50 years.  This ubiquitous data network based on low level public 
technical standards has displaced well-established sophisticated high level networks and has 
grown to reach a very large percentage of computers worldwide.  At the core of the ability of the 
Internet to provide transport services lie the Internet backbones.  The Internet backbone market 
has quickly grown to extremely high capacity of transmission and has surpassed the transmission 
capacity of the traditional long distance network.  Despite ups and downs, including the dot com 
                                                 
38 See, id at ¶ 57.   31
boom and bust and the WorldCom accounting scandal and bankruptcy, the Internet backbone 
market has shown robust competition.  The dire predictions of the European Union Competition 
Authority in 1998 and 2000 that the Internet would be dominated by a single firm that would 
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Apex Global Information Services (AGIS) 
AT&T Networked Commerce Services  
Cable & Wireless USA  
CAIS  
Concentric  
CRL Network Services 
Digital Broadcast Network Corp  
Electric Lightwave 
EPOCH Networks, Inc.  
e.spire 
Exodus 
Fiber Network Solutions  
Frontier Global Center 
Globix  
GTE Internetworking 
GST Communications  
IBM Global Services 
ICG/Netcom Online  
IDT Internet Services  
Intermedia Business Internet 
Internet Access/GetNet 
Internet Services of America 
IXC Communications, Inc 
Level 3 
MCI WorldCom — Advanced Networks 
MCI WorldCom — UUNET  
NetRail  
PSINet, Inc. 
Qwest/Icon CMT  
Rocky Mountain Internet/DataXchange  
Savvis Communications Corporation 
ServInt 
Splitrock Services  
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Table 2:  Market Shares of National Internet Backbones
39 
Market Share  1997  1999  2001  2003 
MCI WorldCom   43%  38% 35% 32% 
GTE-BBN  13%  15% 16% 17% 
AT&T   12%  11% 14% 19% 
Sprint   12%  9% 8% 7% 
Cable &Wireless   9%  6% 6% 6% 
All Other   11%  21% 22% 19% 
Total  100%  100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 3:  MAEs’ Capacity Growth and Utilization 
  Capacity (Gbps)   Sales (Gbps) 
  1997  1999  January 2000  January 2000 
MAE-East  7.6  11.2  19.9  11.4 
MAE-West  4.3  11.2  19.9  11.8 














                                                 
39 Source: Hearing on the MCI WorldCom-Sprint Merger Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Exhibit 3 
(Nov 4, 1999) (Testimony of Tod A. Jacobs, Senior Telecommunications Analyst, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., 
Inc.), Bernstein Research, MCI WorldCom (March 1999) at p. 51.   37
Table 4:  Comparison of Early 1999 Monthly Prices of AT&T and 




Service  AT&T  UUNET  Price Difference =  
UUNET-AT&T 
Burstable 0-6 Mbps  $12,500 $12,000  $ - 500 
Burstable 6.01 – 7.5 Mbps  $14,000 $14,000  $0 
Burstable 7.51 – 9 Mbps  $17,000 $17,000  $0 
Burstable 9.01 - 10.5 Mbps  $19,000 $19,000  $0 
Burstable 10.51 - 12 Mbps  $22,000 $22,000  $0 
Burstable 12.01 - 13.5 Mbps  $26,000 $26,000  $0 
Burstable 13.51 - 15 Mbps  $29,000 $29,000  $0 
Burstable 15.01 - 16.5 Mbps  $32,000 $32,000  $0 
Burstable 16.51 - 18 Mbps  $37,000 $37,000  $0 
Burstable 18.01 - 19.5 Mbps  $43,000 $43,000  $0 
Burstable 19.51 - 21 Mbps  $48,000 $48,000  $0 



















                                                 
40 Source: Boardwatch Magazine’s Directory of Internet Service Providers, 11
th Edition, 1999.   38
Table 5:  Comparison of 1999 and 2001 Monthly Prices of AT&T 








Percentage Price Difference 
(p2001 - p1999)/p2001 
Burstable 0-6 Mbps  $12,500 $6,550  -47.60% 
Burstable 6.01 – 7.5 Mbps  $14,000 $8,150  -41.79% 
Burstable 7.51 – 9 Mbps  $17,000 $9,250  -45.59% 
Burstable 9.01 - 10.5 Mbps  $19,000 $10,150  -46.58% 
Burstable 10.51 - 12 Mbps  $22,000 $11,050  -49.77% 
Burstable 12.01 - 13.5 Mbps  $26,000 $11,950  -54.04% 
Burstable 13.51 - 15 Mbps  $29,000 $12,850  -55.69% 
Burstable 15.01 - 16.5 Mbps  $32,000 $13,600  -57.50% 
Burstable 16.51 - 18 Mbps  $37,000 $14,350  -61.22% 
Burstable 18.01 - 19.5 Mbps  $43,000 $15,100  -64.88% 
Burstable 19.51 - 21 Mbps  $48,000 $15,850  -66.98% 















                                                 
41 Source: Boardwatch Magazine’s Directory of Internet Service Providers, 11
th and 13
th Editions, 1999 and 2001.   39




Year  # ISPs  Number Of Backbone 
Connections Sold To 
ISPs 
Share Of Additional Connections 
Sold To Multihoming ISPs 
1997 4,354  5,739  24% 
1998 4,470  5,913  24% 
1999 5,078  8,950  43% 
 
Table 7:  Growth of ISP Industry
43 
 
Number Of North American ISPs  Date 
1447 February  1996 
2266 May  1996 
3747 April  1997 
4354 October  1997 
5078 1999 
 
Table 8:  Growth of US National Backbone Operators
44 
Number of US National Backbone Operators  Date 
9 Summer  1996 
22 May  1997 
37 Fall  1997 
43 1999 
                                                 
 
42  Sources: Boardwatch Magazine’s Directory of Internet Service Providers, Fall 1997, p. 6. Boardwatch 
Magazine’s Directory of Internet Service Providers, Winter 1998, p. 5. Boardwatch Magazine’s Directory of 
Internet Service Providers, 11th Edition, 1999, p. 4.  The last column is calculated as the difference between the 
third and the second columns divided by the third column, for example, for 1999, (8950-5078)/8950 = 43.26% 
rounded to 43%. 
43  Source: Boardwatch magazine, Fall 1997, and 11
th edition, Fall 1999. 
44  Source: Boardwatch Magazine, Fall 1999.  Boardwatch acknowledges excluding backbone providers from its 
directory, which otherwise would have brought the total to 47.   40
Table 9:  Contrast between the Assumptions of Cremer et al. (2000)  
and Internet Facts 
 
Issue  Assumptions of Cremer 






Consumers do not demand 
universal connectivity 




to Switch Internet 
Provider 




Easy customer migration 
 
Effects of Congestion on 
Network Performance 
 
Interconnection is totally 
degraded when capacity is 
slightly exceeded 
Networks have spare capacity; 
in situations of congestion, 




Table 10:  Contrast between the Results of Cremer et al. (2000) and 
Results when Customer Migration is Allowed 
 
Issue Claims  By  Cremer  et al. 
(2000)  
 
Results When Customer 
Migration Is Allowed 
Strategic Power  Dominance by “large” 
network 
 
Equal bargaining power 
among networks 
Dynamic Effects  “Snowballing” or “tipping” 
leading to monopoly 
 
Equilibrium at equal market 
shares; no “snowballing” or 
“tipping” 
 
Willingness of Providers 
to Interconnect 
 
Even a slightly larger 
network will refuse to 
interconnect with other 
networks 
 
Network externalities and 
demand for universal 





                                                 
45 For example, the European Union Commission, in its Statement of Objections to the MCI WorldCom merger 
recognized the lack of validity of Cremer et al.'s first assumption in stating that “the demand for Internet 
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  Figure 4: Traffic flows after a price increase by ISP 0 
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Appendix 
A1.  Duopoly 
 
I re-examine the duopoly model of Cremer et al. (2000), section 4, keeping all the assumptions 
of the model, except one: I allow customers in the installed base of each network to migrate to 
the other network if price and quality considerations so warrant.  Thus, in my modification, the 
size of the network (sales) and the installed base coincide.  All the symbols are the same as in 
Cremer et al. except that now output of firm i is qi rather than qi + βi .   
 
In particular, as in Cremer et al. (2000), I assume two interconnected Internet backbone 
networks, i = 1, 2, with θ in [0, 1] being the quality of interconnection between the networks and 
v signifying the importance of connectivity.  Cremer et al. assume that backbone i has an 
installed base of captured customers βi who do not respond to prices and would not sign up with 
a backbone other than i at any price.  Backbone i also has qi customers who respond to prices.  
Assuming that the quality of interconnection within a backbone is θ = 1, Cremer et al. define the 
“quality” of service of backbone i corresponding to its ability to reach customers as 
 
si = v[(βi + qi) + θ(βj + qj)]     (1) 
 
As mentioned earlier, in the analysis in Cremer et al., customers βi and βj are not allowed to 
change providers.  Cremer et al. show (Proposition 1) that under these conditions, for some 
parameter values, the larger of the two backbones chooses a lower interconnection quality (θ) 
than its rival, and that the quality of interconnection that the larger backbone chooses decreases 
in the difference between the captured customers of the larger and the smaller networks who are 
not allowed to change providers.  
 
If, alternatively, all customers are allowed to buy service from a competing backbone, that is the 
number of captive customers is zero, βi = βj = 0, then Cremer et al.’s equation (1) that defines the 
quality of good i becomes 
 
si = v(qi + θqj). 
 
Equation (2) remains as in Cremer et al.  Equations (3) and (4) defining willingness to pay for 
each backbone become 
 
qi + qj = 1 - (pi  - si ) = 1 - (pj  - sj), 
 
pi  = 1 - (qi + qj) + si = 1 + v(qi + θqj) - (qi + qj),  i = 1, 2. 
 
Profits of firm (backbone) i are 
 
Πi = (pi - c)qi = [1 + v(qi + θqj) - (qi + qj) - c]qi. 
 
Maximization with respect to qi results in the best response of firm i to the sales of the opponent: 
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qi = Ri(qj) = [1 - c - qj(1 - vθ)]/[2(1 - v)]. 
 
Cournot equilibrium sales (network sizes) are then 
 
qi
* =   qj
* = (1 - c)/[3 - v(2 + θ)]. 
 
Notice that, for all  θ, that is whatever the degree of network interconnection quality, both 
networks have exactly the same size, qi
* =  qj
*.  Thus, when customers in the installed base are 
allowed to migrate across networks, contrary to the results of Cremer et al., there is no network 
dominance at the market equilibrium. 
 
Equilibrium profits of the two networks are equal: 
 
Πi
* = (1 - v)(qi
*)









*/dθ > 0. 
 
Thus, contrary to Proposition 1 of Cremer et al., both networks have equal and positive 
incentives to maintain a high quality of interconnection between them. 
 
A2. Merger  Analysis 
 
I examine the merger analysis model of Cremer et al. section 6, keeping all the assumptions of 
the model, except one: I allow customers in the installed base of each network to migrate to the 
other network if price and quality considerations so warrant.  As in the duopoly model above, the 
size of the network (sales) and the installed base coincide so that all the symbols are the same as 
in Cremer et al. except that now output of firm i is qi rather than qi + βi . 
 
Cremer et al. start with four networks of equal sizes.  In the original equilibrium, all networks 
have equal sizes and profits.  After a merger between two of them, there are three networks in the 
market.  In the “targeted degradation” scenario of Cremer et al., network 1 severs its 
interconnection to network 3, while maintaining full interconnection to network 2.  Networks 2 
and 3 are fully interconnected, but network 3 is not allowed to use network 2 for transit to 
network 1.  Cremer et al. show that, for some parameters, the merged firm will prefer to follow 
the “targeted degradation” strategy (Proposition 6). 
 
However, if one alternatively assumes that the installed base of each network is allowed to 
migrate to the other network if price and quality considerations so warrant, the “targeted 
degradation” result of Cremer et al. is reversed.  Specifically, calling qi the sales of firm I, after a 
merger between two of the four networks, there are now three networks in the market.  Assuming 
no degradation, their prices and profits are 
 
pi = 1 - (q1 + q2 + q3) + v(q1 + q2 + q3),   Πi = (pi - c)qi , i = 1, 2, 3, 
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Equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits without degradation are  
 
qi
* = (1 - c)/[4(1 - v)],  pi
* = (1 + 3c)/4,   Πi
* = (1 - c)
2/[16 (1 - v)]. 
 
Now consider the “targeted degradation” scenario of Cremer et al. as described above.  In this 
scenario, network 1 severs its interconnection to network 3, while maintaining full 
interconnection to network 2.  As in Cremer et al., although networks 2 and 3 are fully 
interconnected, I assume that network 3 is not allowed to use network 2 for transit to network 1.  
Then prices and profits are: 
 
p1 = 1 - (q1 + q2 + q3) + v(q1 + q2),    p2 = 1 - (q1 + q2 + q3) + v(q1 + q2 + q3), 
 
p3 = 1 - (q1 + q2 + q3) + v(q1 + q2),     Πi = (pi - c) qi . 
 





d = (1 - c)/[2(2 - v)],    q1




d = [1 + 3c - v(1 + c)]/[2(2 - v)],    p2




d = (1 - c)
 2(1 - v)/[4(2 - v)
 2],    Π2
d = (1 - c)
 2/[4(1 - v)(2 - v)
 2]. 
 
I now compare profits of network 1 with and without targeted degradation of interconnection.  It 
is easy to show that profits of network 1 without degradation are higher than profits of the same 




d = (1 - c)
2(4 - 3v)v/[16(2 - v)
 2(1 - v)]  > 0, 
 
since 0 < v < 1.  Therefore, contrary to Cremer et al., if all consumers are allowed to change 
providers if prices and qualities so warrant, network 1 (the largest one) finds it profitable not to 
use “targeted degradation.” 
 